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STUDENT NOTES

Wrongful Death Action for Prenatal Injury
The allowance of recovery for injuries or death of an unborn child
is a comparatively recent development in tort law. The issue was
first raised in a case in which damages were sought for prenatal
injuries to an infant.' The court, in an opinion written by Oliver
Wendell Holmes, denied recovery, holding that the child was part
of the mother and that any recovery for injuries to the child would
have to be in an action by the mother' The view expressed in this
case was followed by other courts for a number of years.' The
first opinion contrary to this thinking was expressed in the dissenting
opinion by Judge Boggs in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital.4 He
expressed the view that once a baby is viable, it should be considered to be a separate person. It could survive if its mother died;
therefore, to consider the mother and baby to be one person is
unrealistic. Being a separate person, the baby should have a separate
right of action to recover for prenatal injuries.5 This view was not
adopted until 1946 in the case of Bonbrest v. Kotz.6 The overwhelming majority of courts have since adopted it.! Some courts
have extended the rule to allow recovery for prenatal injuries even
if inflicted before the fetus becomes viable.'
A seemingly logical extension of allowing recovery for prenatal
injuries is allowing recovery for fatal prenatal injuries. The first
case allowing recovery for the wrongful death of a stillborn child
was decided in 1949.' Many other jurisdictions have subsequently
adopted the view allowing recovery."0
' Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
1d.
3
A listing of such cases and a more complete discussion of the Dietrich
case may be found in Ruley, Recovery of Damages for Injuries Sustained by
Children en Ventre sa Mere, 65 W. VA. L. Rv. 197, 199 (1963).
4 184 Ill.
359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
5 Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Il. 359, 370-71, 56 N.E. 638, 641
(1900) (dissenting opinion). Further discussion of this case may be found in
Ruley, supra note 3, at 199-200.
6 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
7 A list of these cases and a discussion of their merits may be found
in Ruley, supra note 3 at 200-02.
1Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipeline Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727
(1956); Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961); Bennett
v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958); Smith v. Brennan, 31 NJ.
353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93
(1960); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222 (R.I. 1966).
910Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
A listing and discussion of such cases may be found in Ruley, supra
note 3, at 204-05. See also Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75 (4th
Cir. 1964); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966);
2
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No decision on whether an action for the wrongful death of a
stillborn child could be maintained in West Virginia had been
rendered prior to 1969. The case which decided this issue as one
of first impression in West Virginia was Panagopoulous v. Martin."
The cause of action arose out of a collision between a motor vehicle
operated by the defendant and a motor vehicle in which the plaintiff
was a passenger. The plaintiff was in her eighth month of
pregnancy on the date the accident occurred and delivered a stillborn
child on the same day as a result of the injuries she received in the
accident. The child was viable when the accident occurred. The
plaintiff then brought an action under the West Virginia Wrongful
Death statute for the death of the stillborn child. The defendant
sought a dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action. The federal court in this case denied the defendant's motion
stating that it believed that if the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals were to decide a similar case, it would hold that the action
was maintainable."2
The court in reaching its decision first examined West Virginia's
Wrongful Death statute. 3 Accordingly, it determined that a necessary prerequisite to the bringing of an action for wrongful death is
the death of a person as a result of the wrongful act of another under
each circumstances as would have allowed the injured person to
have maintained an action to recover damages if he had survived. 4
The court therefore found it necessary to determine if a recovery of
damages for prenatal injuries would be allowed in West Virginia.
No previous West Virginia case had discussed this issue. On the
basis of the trend of the decisions allowing recovery for prenatal
injuries and the fact that there were no West Virginia decisions to
the contrary, the court decided that the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in a similar case would uphold a cause of action
by a child for prenatal injuries. If this were so, the requirement
of the Wrongful Death statute that the decedent would have been
entitled to maintain an action if he had survived is satisfied.' If
Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); Fowler v. Woodward,

244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).
"2 Civil No. 1062 (S.D.W.Va., January 17, 1969.

' id. at 1, 11, 12.
73 W. VA. CODE, ch. 55, art. 7, § 5 (Michie 1966).
14 Id.; Panagopoulous v. Martin, Civil No. 1062 (S.D.W. Va., Jan. 17,
1969) at 3.
is Panagopoulous v. Martin, Civil No. 1062 (S.D.W. Va., Jan. 17, 1969)
at 7.
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the court had decided that West Virginia would not allow recovery for
prenatal injuries, this would have, of necessity, been a determination
that an action for wrongful death would not be allowed.
The court next explored the question of whether or not an unborn
child is a person as required by the Wrongful Death statute. The
court stated that in order to be consistent and logical, if an unborn
child is a "person" when protected from prenatal injuries, it must
also be considered a "person" in relation to a wrongful death action.
The court held, therefore, that a unborn child is a "person" within
the meaning of the West Virginia statute.' 6 The court's resolution of
this issue was the only logical possibility. If an unborn child is
determined to be a person for one type of action, he should be
considered to be a person in all closely related types of actions.
A last question decided by the court was whether or not it would
be possible to determine what damages could be awarded in a case
of a stillborn child where economic loss would be impossible to prove.
The court again examined the West Virginia Wrongful Death
statute.' Under the statute the jury may award up to ten thousand
dollars damages as "they deem fair and just" and up to one
hundred thousand dollars for pecuniary loss suffered by the
decedent's distributees. 8 The court showed that previous West
Virginia cases had held that the jury in relation to the first ten
thousand dollars may consider sorrow, grief, and mental distress
suffered by a relative. The court stated that there would be no
greater problem of proof in the case of the death of an unborn child
than in the case of any other death. These initial damages could,
therefore, be awarded in a wrongful death action for the death of a
stillborn child. The court stated further that no damages could be
16 Id. at 9. It is interesting to note that the court cited the decision of
Richards v. Riverside Ironworks, 56 W. Va. 510, 515, 49 S.E. 437, 438 (1904)
in which it was said that "The [wrongful death] statute is remedial and
should be construed liberally for the purpose of carrying out the legislative
intent." (Emphasis added). Other courts in at least two states have held
that an unborn child is not a person because the legislature did not intend for
them to be so considered. Estate of Powers v. City of Troy, 380 Mich. 160,
156 N.W.2d 530 (1968) (statute was enacted in 1848 and at that time the
normal meaning of the word "person" would not include a fetal child);
Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958) (legislature
did not contemplate that an unborn child would be considered a "person"
under the statute). The basic wrongful death statute in West Virginia was
enacted
in 1863.
7
1 W. VA. CODE, ch. 55, art. 7, § 6 (Michie 1966).

18 Id.
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awarded for pecuniary losses for these were virtually impossible to
prove."9 The fact that damages can be awarded under the West
Virginia Wrongful Death statute for other than pecuniary losses
eliminates the factor that has been decisive in most jurisdictions which
have denied recovery in actions for the wrongful death of a stillborn
child. In these jurisdictions damages for wrongful death are limited
to pecuniary losses which in the case of a stillborn child would be too
speculative.2 °
It must be remembered that the decision in the Martin case simply
denied a defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action. It must also be noted that this decision was reached by a
federal court and not by the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals." It does appear, however, that the chief obstacle that
blocks recovery for wrongful death of a stillborn child in most cases
-the requirement of pecuniary loss-does not exist under West
Virginia law.
The next extension of the doctrine allowing recovery for wrongful
death may be to allow recovery for the death of a nonviable, unborn
child. Some commentators have argued that this extension is only
logical22 and conforms with modern biological theory that a fetus is
a "person" at its earliest stage of development.23 This would,
however, lead to more speculative conclusions as to the child's actual
chances of eventual birth.
Allowing recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus at any stage
of development would also appear to conflict with the modern
trend of liberal abortion laws. It would be difficult to justify the
abortion of a fetus at its early stage of development as not taking
19 Panagopoulous v. Martin, Civil No. 1062 (S.D.W. Va., Jan. 17, 1969)
at 10-11.
20 Cases so holding include Acton v. Shields, 386 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1965);
Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Estate of Logan, 4
Misc. 2d 283, 156 N.Y.S.2d 49, affd, 2 App. Div. 2d 842, 156 N.Y.S.2d
152 (1956), af'd, 3 N.Y.2d 800, 166 N.Y.S.2d 3, 144 N.E.2d 644 (1957);
Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966).
21 In one jurisdiction a federal court held that recovery would be allowed
under the state's laws for the wrongful death of a stillborn child. Gullborg
v. Rizzo, 331 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1964). Shortly thereafter, however, the high
court of the same state denied recovery for the wrongful death of a stillborn
child.22 Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964).
Ruley, supra note 3, at 205-06.
23 Del Tufo, Recovery for Prenatal Torts: Actions for Wrongful Death,
15 RUTEmRs L. Rav. 61, 78 (1960).
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the life of a "person" and at the same time declare that a fetus at a
similar stage of development is a "person" so as to allow recovery
for its wrongful death. This would allow intentional termination of
development in the first case without adverse legal consequences yet
give adverse legal consequences to what may be an unintentional
termination of development in the second case. How these problems
might be solved remains for future determination.
John Reed Homburg
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